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* Corporate giving as an expression of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been
researched less than the more general theme of CSR. In addition, much of the research in
this area focuses on countries with an Anglo cultural tradition.
* The study outlined in this paper offers a comprehensive longitudinal study of corporate
giving in the Netherlands. An overview is provided of corporate giving in the Netherlands
in the period from 1995 till 2003.
* The data are gathered by means of a biennial survey of Dutch companies as part of the
‘Giving in the Netherlands’ project. Based on these findings, recent developments in
corporate giving can be sketched out.
* Moreover, literature onmotives for corporate giving behavior is focuseduponandapplied
in exploring Dutch managers’ motivations for offering donations. Nonprofit organiza-
tions could use this knowledge to increase the efficiency of their fund raising.
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Introduction
As in many other countries, companies’ activ-
ities for the public good also attract a lot of
media attention in the Netherlands. For
instance, TNT (formerly known as ‘TPG’)
continues to receive attention from the Dutch
daily national newspapers due to its coopera-
tion with the United Nations in the World Food
Program (Klok, 2004). Journalist Vossen con-
cludes that it is not the question whether but
rather how companies will be involved in
foreign aid (Lubbers, 2004). Similar sugges-
tions are found in the literature. Porter and
Kramer (2002) state that corporate philan-
thropy is increasingly being used as a form of
public relations, to promote a company’s
image or brand. McAlister and Ferrell (2002)
note that corporate giving gradually seems to
be taking up a more prominent position in
business strategy. This is in agreement with the
results of the study of Saiia et al. (2003) who
found that managers active in corporate giving
believe that corporate giving is becoming more
strategic. Corporate giving and the strategic
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goals and resources of the organizations are
becoming more aligned with each other. From
this perspective, strategic philanthropy is part
of a broader philosophy that recognizes how
corporate giving can help an organization
improve its overall performance (McAlister
and Ferrell, 2002). Despite its more prominent
position in business strategy, there are rela-
tively few empirical studies about corporate
giving. Gaining more insight into these motives
is important for nonprofit organizations as it
enables them to develop a customer-oriented
marketing strategy. The focal point of a
customer-oriented marketing strategy is to
understand its potential contributors (Hsieh,
2004).
Philanthropy has been defined as ‘benevo-
lent behavior, usually in the form of charitable
gifts, towards others in society’ (Andreoni,
2001). In corporate social responsibility (CSR)
literature, corporate philanthropy is often
mentioned as one of the four social responsi-
bilities of a company (Carroll, 1979, 1999).
Although the general theme of CSR has
received a lot of scholarly attention Campbell
et al. (2002) note that empirical studies of the
philanthropic responsibilities of companies
are relatively scarce. Moreover, many studies
and reports about corporate giving are situated
in Anglo cultural countries (Navarro, 1988;
Campbell et al., 2002; American Association of
Fundraising Counsel, 2004), leading Seifert,
Morris and Bartkus (2003) to call for studies
that focus on corporate giving patterns in
countries outside the United States. By focus-
ing on corporate giving in the Netherlands, this
paper answers their call, aiming to enrich the
literature about corporate giving from a con-
tinental European perspective. Contrary to the
United States, the Netherlands is a well-devel-
oped welfare state (Jantti, 1997). Whereas 59%
of the revenues of the nonprofit sector in the
Netherlands come from the public sector, this
figure is 30% in the United States (Salamon,
1999).
In addition to providing an overview of to
what kind of societal causes Dutch companies
give, and how much they donate, a specific
focus in this paper will be on the companies’
motives for engaging in such giving. Consider-
ing these motives is relevant as different
motives might be important in different forms
of corporate giving. In the present study, two
forms of corporate giving will be examined:
corporate sponsorship and corporate charita-
ble giving. In the case of corporate sponsor-
ship, the recipient organization is expected to
do something in return (for example by
displaying the sponsor’s name on leaflets). In
the case of corporate charitable giving—
which is used in the present study as a synonym
for corporate philanthropy—the recipient
organization is not expected to do something
in return. Dean (2003) calls these donations
unconditional as such giving is ‘not linked to
revenue-producing transactions with the firm.’
Both forms of corporate giving are taken into
account, as are the motives indicated by Dutch
managers for engaging in either form of
corporate giving.
Motivations for corporate giving
Motivations for corporate giving have
received much scholarly attention in the last
decade (Adams and Hardwick, 1998; Bennett,
1998; Campbell et al., 1999, 2002; Sa´nchez,
2000). Drawing from these studies, several
categories of motivations can be distin-
guished. A review of the literature leads us
to focus on five different motivations for
corporate giving: commercial motivations,
altruistic motivations, local community sup-
port, employee commitment and personal
motivations of the manager. The first two
motives stem directly from the two extreme
forms of corporate giving, that is, sponsoring
and corporate charitable giving. The other
three motivations could be related to address-
ing stakeholder interests, as will be discussed
below.
Commercial motivations
Corporate giving can be driven by commercial
motivations. Managers may want to improve
the organization’s competitiveness, to increase
the familiarity of their company’s name, or to
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get access to new connections. These types of
motivations fit into the profit maximization
model. This model of business responsibility is
commonly attributed to neo-classical econo-
mists such as Milton Friedman. In his classic
New York Times article, ‘The social responsi-
bility of business is to increase its profits,’
Friedman (1970) argues that the corporate
executive is an employee of the owners of the
business. Therefore, this executive has to serve
the interest of the owners of business, which
will generally be to make as much money as
possible, while playing by the basic rules of
society. The profit-maximizing model of cor-
porate philanthropy postulates that philan-
thropy must contribute to direct financial
gain, just like any other function within the
organization (Neiheisel, 1994).
Navarro (1998) examined the profit-max-
imizing model empirically. He assumed that
profit-maximizing managers may regard corpo-
rate giving as part of their advertising strategy,
from which he hypothesized that a company’s
advertising expenses should have a positive
impact on the corporate giving-to-sales ratio.
The results of his study confirmed that profit
maximization is an important motive driving
corporate giving. Recently, Saiia et al. (2003)
also studied commercial motivations for cor-
porate giving by focusing on strategic philan-
thropy. They hypothesized, for instance, that
managers who engage in corporate giving
would pursue a more ‘strategic’ philanthropic
policy, since financial responsibilities are of
fundamental concern for business, and corpo-
rate philanthropy has to compete with adver-
tising budgets. The findings of their survey
among 125 managers confirmed that commer-
cial motivations drive the engagement in
corporate giving. However, many of these
results were obtained in a North American
setting.
Bennett (1998) presented a pioneering study
of corporate giving in Europe. He examined
whether European managers applied commer-
cial or philanthropic criteria to the manage-
ment of corporate giving. He conducted a
survey in the United Kingdom, France and
Germany among companies that stated that
they made charitable and/or community dona-
tions. One of the hypotheses was that compa-
nies in all three countries would use
commercial criteria for the management of
corporate philanthropy, rather than treating
corporate philanthropy as a purely altruistic
activity. Several items were used to address this
hypothesis. Examples of these items were ‘the
extent to which philanthropic businesses
take corporate philanthropy into account
when formulating their overall marketing
plans’ (p. 466) and items that focused on the
criteria that were applied when selecting
particular good causes for corporate support,
such as ‘the public image of the good cause
(p. 467).’ Bennett concluded that business
managers in France, Germany and the UK
generally adopted a commercial orientation to
corporate giving.
Altruistic motivations
In contrast to commercial motivations, which
are driven by ‘enlightened self-interest,’
(Varadarajan and Menon, 1988) corporate
giving may also be explained by altruism,
giving by the company with nothing expected
in return (Neiheisel, 1994; Sharfman, 1994;
Campbell et al., 1999; Edmondson and
Carroll, 1999; Sa´nchez, 2000; Campbell,
2002). Campbell et al. (1999) and Cowton
(1987) found that altruistic reasons were most
often mentioned when companies were asked
about their motivations for giving. However, a
social desirability bias may play a role in these
findings as it is possible that respondents over-
report altruistic motives for giving since
that would be politically correct (Campbell
et al., 1999).
Neiheisel (1994) argues that the primary
limitation of regarding altruism as the sole
motivation of corporate giving is the ignoring
of the profit-maximizing goal of the corpo-
ration. According to Neiheisel, it can
be doubted whether a company would spend
excess profit on public good rather than on
executive salaries or investments. We will
return to this point in the discussion section
of this paper.
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Local community support
The need to support the local community can
be another driver of corporate giving. Navarro
(1988) postulated that cost considerations may
play a role in the decision of the company to
support the local community. As he suggests, a
company’s contribution to the safety of the
area is to the benefit of the company, since it
reduces the risks of theft and vandalism. In the
Netherlands, however, public concerns such
as safety, education, and health are primarily
seen as the responsibilities of the government.
‘In health, public payments at 96 per cent are
virtually the sole revenue source, and this is
almost as true for education, where public
support accounts for 91 per cent of revenues’
(Burger et al., 1999, p.159). As the Netherlands
is a welfare state, all citizens are guaranteed
certain levels of income and health care within
the borders of the free market economy and a
democratic political constitution (Jantti, 1997;
Schuyt, 2003). It can be postulated that Dutch
companies will be more likely to contribute to
the safety and social coherence of an area if the
welfare state should fall apart.
Besser (1999) examined the effects of
community involvement on the perceived
success of small business operators in Iowa,
the United States. From her telephone inter-
views with 1008 business owners and man-
agers, it appeared that the more business
owners invested in the community, the more
positive they were about the success of their
company. The findings were controlled for
community, business, and operator demo-
graphics. However, Besser did not address
the ‘causality issue.’ Hence, it is possible that
the perceived success of the company influ-
ences the amount of money that business
owners invest in the community. If a company
makes a profit, there is probably more money
available for the company to invest in the
community than if the company suffers from
heavy losses.
Employee commitment
Although several studies focus on the relation-
ship between corporate social performance
and employer attractiveness (Turban and
Greening, 1997; Greening and Turban, 2000;
Backhaus et al., 2002), studies on the effects of
corporate giving on employee commitment
toward the company are rather scarce. From a
stakeholder perspective this seems remark-
able. Stakeholder theory suggests that compa-
nies maintain relationships with crucial
stakeholders, as this might constitute a compe-
titive advantage over companies that do so to a
lesser degree (Freeman, 1984, 1999; Donald-
son and Preston, 1995), Employees often are
considered one of these crucial stakeholder
categories in corporate social performance
research (Backhaus, 2002). Several theoretical
studies and some empirical ones showed that
the way a firm manages its employees can
indeed affect its financial results (Huselid,
1995; Delery, 1996; Berman et al., 1999). It is
useful to distinguish increasing employee
commitment as a separate motive as, until
now, this motive hardly has been taken into
account in previous studies regarding man-
agers’ motives for corporate giving (Fry et al.,
1982; Navarro, 1988; Haley, 1991; Sa´nchez,
2000; Campbell et al., 2002).
Personal motivations
Personal motivations suggest that corporate
giving is driven less by commercial or altruistic
interests but based on the personal interests of
the manager (Williamson, 1964; Navarro, 1988;
Haley, 1991; Campbell et al., 2002). Managers
may use corporate giving to enhance or
maintain their status, power and prestige, as
is suggested by several authors (Williamson,
1964; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Haley, 1991). Galas-
kiewicz (1985) explains why some managers
would use corporate giving in order to win the
respect of the elite, and that the personal
background characteristic of the chief execu-
tive officer may play an important role.
Galaskiewicz, therefore, postulates that if
giving the firm’s money to charity will enhance
his/her company’s reputation in the eyes of the
local business community—and thus his/her
own reputation as well—it is likely that the
firm will contribute to charity. In the CSR
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literature, Carroll originally identified manage-
rial discretion as one of four social responsi-
bilities, later rephrasing this responsibility as
‘philanthropy’ (Carroll, 1999).
A closely related category of philanthropy is
distinguished by Duncan (2004, p. 2160), who
proposed the concept of ‘impact philan-
thropy,’ which he defines as a form of
philanthropy in which ‘donors contribute
because they enjoy personally increasing the
output of a good.’ Personal motivations then
play a crucial role as a donor gives because of
the personal recognition he/she gets in return.
Similar processes might come into play once
companies engage in exclusive relationships
with a beneficiary, and managers have to make
decisions on philanthropic engagements. In
addition, the initial contact between organiza-
tion and beneficiary may be a result of the
personal interests of the manager. Siegfried et
al. (1983) undertook an interview survey of
240 large American companies in 14 metropo-
litan areas. They found that 92 per cent of the
companies in their sample admitted that
corporate giving was affected by corporate
executives’ relationships with charitable orga-
nizations.
Methodology
The present study is part of the ‘Giving in the
Netherlands’ project (Schuyt, 1999, 2001,
2003), which has been running for nearly a
decade. Giving in the Netherlands is an
academic project that collects both corporate
giving data and data about the giving behavior
of individuals and households. The Dutch
charity sector and Dutch ministries use the
findings of the Giving in the Netherlands
publications as key figures about giving in the
Netherlands. The structure of the Giving in the
Netherlands studies is more or less analogous
to the Giving USA studies (e.g. Giving USA
2004, American Association of Fundraising
Counsel, 2004).
The data used for this study were gathered by
means of a biennial survey of Dutch corpora-
tions. The survey examines how much compa-
nies give, in money or in kind, to what type of
goals they give, and what managers’ motives
are to give. Respondents in this survey pre-
dominantly were members of the management
team or owners of a company; only 17% of the
respondents held other positions. All respon-
dents were interviewed by interviewers of a
large market research agency by means of
‘Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing’
(CATI). The structured use of this technique
can assist in the administration of telephone
surveys and contribute to reducing sources of
survey error (Shangraw, 1986).
The polls were conducted every two years
between 1996 and 2004; respondents were
asked to indicate the figures on corporate
giving for the previous year. This means that in
the survey of 1996, data were obtained about
corporate giving in 1995. In each of the five
waves, approximately 1000 companies parti-
cipated in the survey. This is a relatively large
sample size for a survey of corporations,
compared to other studies (Logsdon et al.,
1990; Murray, 1991; Coy and Nolan, 1992;
Zippay, 1992). Seifert et al. (2003) note that
most recent studies of corporate giving have
included firms from many industries in order to
control for environmental conditions. That is
also the approach that has been taken in the
present study. See the Appendix (TableA1) for
the exact number of respondents per wave, the
distribution of the companies across different
industries, and the size of the companies
(measured by the number of staff members).
An identification number (keying variable) was
available for the companies that participated in
2001 and in 2003. This made it possible to
investigate whether there was a significant
decrease in corporate giving in the year 2003
compared to the year 2001.
Extrapolation of the data and removal
of outliers
A weighting factor was constructed to extra-
polate the sample data to the entire Dutch
industry. Population data of the Dutch industry
are presented in the Appendix (Table A2). It
should be mentioned that in order to estimate
the amounts of corporate giving in 2003,
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business population data of 2002 were used
instead of business population data from 2003,
given the late availability of the 2003 data.
Micro companies have a major impact on the
weighting factor, seeing that 88% of the
companies in the Netherlands are micro
companies (maximum of nine employees).
Only 1% of Dutch companies employ 100 or
more personnel (CBS, 2004). If a small com-
pany (2–4 employees) stated that it gave
3 million euros to sport sponsoring, this heavily
biased the results, seeing that there are a lot of
small companies in the Netherlands. If this
outlier is included in the dataset it is estimated
that 1.26 billion euros was given to sport
sponsoring. If this outlier is removed, the
estimation amounts to 673 million euros.
Therefore, it was decided to remove outliers
from the sample to avoid extremely high
amounts of donations by small companies
influencing the extrapolation. The following
thresholds were defined to remove outliers:
750,000 euros or more for companies with less
than 50 employees, one million euros or more
for companies with less than 100 employees,
and 1.5 million euros or more for companies
with 100 or more employees. There were no
outliers in 2003, three outliers in 2001, and
seven outliers in 1999 (four outliers were from
the same company).
Survey design and measures
First, respondents were asked about corporate
sponsorship. Sponsoring was described to
them as ‘gifts with a commercial interest.’
Several types of recipient organizations were
provided to the respondents. For each type of
recipient organization, respondents were
asked whether their company had sponsored
that category of donation in the previous year
or not. Examples of types of organizations are
sports/recreation, culture, and education/
research (see the first column in Table 1). If
the answer was affirmative, respondents were
asked to indicate the amount of money, the
value of the goods given in kind (in euros), and
the value of donated manpower (in euros).
Rooney et al. (2001) found that a household
was more likely to recall making any charitable
contribution the more detailed prompts were
given. Therefore, in this survey, respondents
were asked how much their company gave for
each category of donation. Managers may react
differently than households though. Subse-
quently, respondents were asked what motives
they had for sponsoring and which of these
motives was the most important to them. Four
of the five different motives that were
described above were operationalized and
defined to the respondents as follows:
Table 1. Total amounts sponsored by Dutch companies after extrapolationmillion euros
2003 2001 1999 1997 1995
Sports/recreation 657 (38%) 573 (52%) 393 (39%) 378 (60%) 194 (41%)
Culture 438 (26%) 242 (22%) 90 (9%) 48 (8%) 39 (8%)
Education/research 207 (12%) 70 (6%) 155 (15%) 55 (9%) 34 (7%)
Societal goals 204 (12%) 81 (7%) 134 (13%) 58 (9%) 116 (25%)
International aid 67 (4%) 14 (1%) 134 (13%) 24 (4%) 61 (13%)
Health 29 (2%) 10 (1%) 29 (3%) 19 (3%) 4 (1%)
Environment 14 (1%) 32 (3%) 35 (3%) 17 (3%) 9 (2%)
Church 22 (1%) 15 (1%) 31 (3%) 14 (2%) 12 (2%)
Other 78 (5%) 72 (7%) — 14 (2%) 1 (1%)
Total in euros 1716 (100%) 1110 (100%) 1001 (100%) 627 (100%) 468 (100%)
N (Unweighted) 1005 998 1010 1092 1122
Note. Percentages in parentheses. The category ‘other’ was not offered to the respondents in 1999. Figures are round
off. One American dollar has a value of 0.87 euros (GWK, 2005).
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—Commercial motivations: It fits with the
commercial aims of our company, market-
ing, competitor advantage, familiarity of the
firm, gives access to new or other contacts;
—Altruistic motivations: Social involvement,
ethical or idealistic motives;
—Supporting local community: We have a
duty towards the civil order, safety and
livability in our environment;
—Employee commitment: It is good for the
internal performance/internal manage-
ment: for example employee commitment
will be increased by sponsoring.
Such categories are not mutually exclusive, as
Cowton (1987) also remarked in his study on
the motivations of British managers to give. The
personal motive was not measured directly, but
after these motives had been mentioned,
respondents were asked whether they had
any other motives for sponsoring or for giving.
The answer category ‘do not know’ was treated
as missing data. The same questions were
repeated for corporate charitable giving, which
was described to the respondents as ‘gifts
without a commercial interest.’ The different
types of motives were measured on a single-
item scale. For pragmatic reasons, i.e., the
length of the telephone interview, it was not
possible to measure the motives using more
items per motive.
Results
In 2003, the estimated total amount that was
given in the Netherlands—both by house-
holds and by companies—was 5.2 billion
euros. Companies gave 43% (gifts and
corporate sponsorship) of this estimated total
(2.27 billion euros) (Schuyt and Gouwenberg,
2005).
In presenting the results for corporate
giving, we will alternate between corporate
sponsorship and corporate giving. As noted
above, some more detailed information has
been gathered about the years 2001 and
2003 by using some ‘keying variables.’ These
two years therefore are examined in greater
detail.
Corporate sponsorship by Dutch
companies between 1995-2003
Table 1 presents the total estimated amount of
money spent by companies for corporate
sponsorship. The value of corporate sponsor-
ship, in kind and in manpower, was expressed
in euros and added to the value of sponsoring in
money (in euros). In each year, companies give
most of their sponsor money to the category
sports and recreation. In 2003, the managers
were asked if they sponsored national or local
organizations. The majority of the mana-
gers (89%) whose companies were involved
in sport sponsorship indicated that they
sponsored local organizations, 6% stated that
they sponsored national organizations, and 5%
sponsored both national and local organiza-
tions. This raises the question of why managers
predominantly choose to sponsor local organi-
zations. Our primary explanation is that
managers sponsor local organizations simply
because they are asked to. 45% of the managers
indicate that the organization they sponsor
initiated the contact with the company.
Another 18% of the managers state that their
company got in touch with the beneficiary
organization through the managers them-
selves, their relatives or their acquaintances.
An alternative explanation could be that
there is a difference in giving between small
and medium-sized companies on the one hand
(companies that employ less than 100 persons)
and large companies (100 or more persons) on
the other. Small and medium-sized compa-
nies—which form 99% of the Dutch business
population—may give to community sports
while large enterprises sponsor national orga-
nizations. In our sample, of the 41 large
enterprises that give to sport sponsoring, only
two large companies (5%) gave to national
organizations. However, this sample did not
focus specifically on the largest companies in
the Netherlands.
Table 1 shows that the Dutch companies
sponsored the public good for approximately
1.7 billion euros in 2003. For the year 2003, it
was possible to test whether the companies
spent significantly more money on corporate
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sponsorship than in 2001. This was indeed the
case (t (1148)¼  2.71, p¼ 0.007 (two-
tailed)). Overall, there seems to be a rising
trend in the total reported amounts sponsored
by Dutch companies. Note that the figures in
Table 1 are not corrected for inflation. The
Dutch Central Office of Statistics, CBS (2005)
provides the yearly inflation figures up to 2002.
If 1995¼ 100, the index number for 2002 is
1094. This means that the total of 468 million
euros given in 1995 would be equal to a total of
512 million euros given in 2001. In 2001 a total
of 1.11 billion euros was estimated to be given
for corporate sponsorship, which more than
doubles the 512 million estimated in 1995.
Nevertheless, these data should be treated with
caution, seeing that they are based on samples.
The amounts of corporate charitable
giving
Table 2 presents the total estimated amount of
money spent by companies for corporate
charitable giving. As was the case with
corporate sponsorship, the value of corporate
charitable giving, of giving in kind, and giving
in manpower was expressed in euros and
added to the value of corporate charitable
giving in money (in euros).
Table 2 shows that, after extrapolation of
the data, the Dutch companies gave the public
good approximately 555 million euros in 2003.
Also, in the case of corporate charitable giving,
most money is given to sports and recreation.
This is in line with the results from a recent
cross-sectional survey in the Netherlands con-
ducted by Van der Heyden and Van der Rijt
(Heyden and Rijt, 2004). They also found that
amateur sports and recreation are the most
popular societal causes for Dutch companies to
support. According to their results, nearly all
(86%) of the companies that support societal
causes support amateur sports and recreation
causes.
The increase in the total amount of corporate
charitable giving from 2001 to 2003 was nearly
significant (t(1566)¼  1.94, p¼ 0.053 (two-
tailed)). Nevertheless, there seems to be a
meandering but rising trend in corporate
charitable giving as well. Future measurements
should point out whether this trend is a
persistent one.
Motivations for corporate sponsorship
In this study, 73% of the respondents men-
tioned one motive for corporate sponsorship,
whereas 21% of the respondents mentioned
two motives for corporate sponsorship, 3%
mentioned three or more motives, and 3% did
not mention any motives. The most important
motivations for managers to sponsor are listed
Table 2. Total amounts of corporate charitable giving by Dutch companies after extrapolationmillion euros
2003 2001 1999 1997 1995
Sports/recreation 188 (34%) 57 (23%) 114 (24%) 10 (16%) 23 (16%)
Health 102 (18%) 36 (14%) 102 (22%) 23 (35%) 13 (9%)
Culture 78 (14%) 32 (13%) 25 (5%) 1 (2%) 18 (13%)
Societal goals 53 (10%) 34 (14%) 50 (11%) 14 (22%) 11 (8%)
Church 38 (7%) 19 (8%) 50 (11%) 2 (2%) 3 (2%)
Education/research 38 (7%) 39 (16%) 24 (5%) 6 (10%) 5 (4%)
International aid 23 (4%) 14 (6%) 78 (17%) 3 (5%) 24 (17%)
Environment 17 (3%) 7 (3%) 22 (5%) 2 (2%) 41 (29%)
Other 17 (3%) 11 (5%) — 4 (6%) 3 (2%)
Total in euros 555 (100%) 249 (100%) 465 (100%) 65 (100%) 141 (100%)
N (Unweighted) 1005 998 1010 1092 1122
Note. Percentages in parentheses. The category ‘other’ was not offered to the respondents in 1999. Figures are round
off.
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in Table 3. Managers claim, even in the case of
corporate sponsorship, that their most impor-
tant motivation to sponsor is altruistic; social
involvement is mentioned by 38% of the
respondents.
The commercial motivation only comes
second (29%). Hardly any manager reports
internal performance or internal management
as a motivation to sponsor. Note that the years
in the columns of Table 3 differ from the years
in the columns concerning the amounts of
corporate sponsorship and corporate charita-
ble giving (Table 1 and 2). This is due to the
fact that in each survey the respondents were
asked about corporate giving in the previous
year, but about their current motivations to
sponsor.
Motivations for corporate charitable
giving
84 per cent of the respondents mentioned one
motive for corporate charitable giving, 12%
mentioned two motives for corporate charita-
ble giving, 1% mentioned three motives, and
4% did not mention any motives. The most
important motivations for respondents to
engage in corporate charitable giving are listed
in Table 4.
Half of the respondents indicated that the
primary reason for corporate charitable giving
is ‘social involvement.’ Commercial interests
were hardly mentioned. It seems logical that
respondents mention social involvement more
often as their primary motivation to give in
Table 3. Most important motivation to sponsor
2004 2002 2000 1998
Social involvement: ethical or idealistic motivations 38% 31% 36% 37%
It fits with the commercial aims of our company, 29% 35% 41% 35%
marketing, competitor advantage, familiarity of
the firm, gives access to new or other contacts
We have a duty towards the civil order, safety and 8% 9% 5% 6%
livability in our environment
It is good for the internal performance/internal 2% 2% 3% 3%
management: for example employee commitment
will be increased by sponsoring
Other . . . 23% 24% 15% 19%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
n¼ 665 n¼ 637 n¼ 705 n¼ 664
Table 4. Most important motivation for corporate charitable giving
2004 2002 2000 1998
Social involvement: ethical or idealistic motives 56% 60% 59% 55%
It fits with the commercial aims of our company, 7% 5% 11% 21%
marketing, competitor advantage, familiarity of the firm,
gives access to new or other contacts
We have a duty towards the civil order, safety and 6% 7% 7% 5%
livability in our environment
It is good for the internal performance/internal management: 2% 2% 3% 1%
for example employee commitment will be increased
by sponsoring
Other . . . 29% 21% 20% 18%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
n¼ 517 n¼ 423 n¼ 513 n¼ 215
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the case of corporate charitable giving than in
the case of corporate sponsorship, since
corporate charitable giving was explained to
them as ‘gifts without commercial interest.’
Overview and discussion of the
findings
This study provides a range of insights into the
figures and motivations for donations by Dutch
companies. The study thus contributes to the
existing literature on corporate giving in
several ways. First, this study contains practical
managerial information for marketers from
both nonprofit organizations and for-profit
firms. Although managers were not asked
whether they think they are receiving too
many requests for corporate giving, the find-
ings of this study suggest that micro, small and
medium-sized companies—which form the
largest part of the population of Dutch
business—are an interesting target for Dutch
nonprofit organizations, especially for the local
ones. As the findings showed, Dutch managers
gave to or sponsored local organizations
because they were approached by the recipi-
ent organization (45%), or because they already
knew the recipient organization (18%). In
addition, 80% of the managers stated that their
company did not have a corporate sponsorship
policy. As well as initiating contacts with local
companies, marketers from nonprofit organi-
zations may consider approaching their own
‘membership base’ for corporate sponsorship
(such as the football players of a local football
team).
As is indicated above, most companies wait
for the nonprofit organizations to approach
them. Marketers of for-profit firms—especially
of the bigger firms—may consider pursuing a
more strategic philanthropy policy by selecting
societal organizations that fit with the core
business of the company (McAlister and Ferrell,
2002). In the Netherlands, the cooperation
between TNT and the World Food Program of
the United Nations is an example of strategic
philanthropy that received a lot of media
attention. TNT is a global provider of mail,
express and logistics services. By defining
world hunger as one of the most persistent
logistic problems, TNT uses its knowledge of
logistics to aid the hungry in the world. TNT did
not only decide to give money but involved its
employees (e.g., by giving time) as well. De
Gilder et al. (2005) showed that employee
volunteering enhances employee commitment
with the organization.
Marketers from non-profit organizations may
take advantage of this trend toward strategic
philanthropy, for example by approaching
companies whose core activities fit with the
activities of the non-profit organization.
Second, this study provides an overview of
corporate donations in the Netherlands at
several points in time. As is mentioned by
Seifert et al. (2003) it is difficult to obtain
reliable longitudinal data on corporate giving.
This is also the case in the Netherlands.
Although the sample sizes were relatively large
for a survey of corporations (Logsdon et al.,
1990; Coy and Nolan, 1992; Zippay, 1992;
Marx, 1999), the extrapolated data of the
amounts of money that have been given by
Dutch industry should be treated with caution.
They serve primarily as rough estimates.
Nevertheless, we believe that this article
presents the most comprehensive longitudinal
study of corporate giving in the Netherlands to
date.
Third, the Giving in the Netherlands study
gives some insights into corporate giving in the
Netherlands compared to corporate giving in
the United States. In 2003, the total estimated
amount that was given (both by individuals
and by companies) in the Netherlands was
5.2 billion euros. This was 1.2% of the Gross
Domestic Product. In the U.S. total giving as a
percentage of GDP for 2003 is estimated at
2.2% (American Association of Fundraising
Counsel, 2004). However, one should be
cautious in interpreting these findings. The
Netherlands and the U.S. have different tax
systems, and the figures in the Netherlands do
not include money given by foundations.
Nevertheless, it is remarkable that Dutch
companies gave an estimated 51% of the total
national amount of estimated giving by house-
holds and by companies, whereas American
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companies only gave an estimated 7% of the
total amount of estimated giving in the U.S.
In the U.S. companies gave an estimated
$13.45 billion in 2003, while individuals gave
an estimated $179.36 billion (American Asso-
ciation of Fundraising Counsel, 2004). In
agreement with the findings in the Nether-
lands, sports is also the most dominant object
for sponsoring in the U.S. In 2004, the
projected North American spending on sports
was 69% (IEG, 2003). Pine and Gilmore (1999)
reason that companies want their consumers
to associate their product with experiences
that engage them in a personal way. Sports and
recreation can provide such experiences.
Fourth, this study provides empirical evi-
dence about the various motives of Dutch
managers for corporate sponsorship and
charity giving. In the case of corporate
sponsorship, the altruistic motivation and
the commercial motivation seem to compete
for the most often-mentioned motivation
throughout the years under study. In the case
of charitable giving, the altruistic motivation
was by far mentioned most often as the main
motivation to give. These results are in
agreement with the results found in Anglo
cultural countries (Cowton, 1987; Campbell
et al., 1999). At first sight, the present study
seems to contrast with the study of Bennett
(1998), who concluded that companies in
France, Germany, and the U.K. adopted a
commercial orientation to corporate giving.
However, as is remarked by Bennett, a
commercial orientation does not rule out
altruistic motives. As Campbell et al. (2002)
suggested, it is likely that several motives play
a role in corporate giving decisions. Neiheisel
(1994) suggests that the altruism motive
ignores the profit-maximizing goal of an
organization. It is rational to assume, how-
ever, that managers want to do good for
society, while they realize at the same time
that it will as a consequence benefit their
company as well. In this study it was found
that 73% of the respondents mentioned one
motive for corporate sponsorship, whereas
21% of the respondents mentioned two
motives for corporate sponsorship.
Since many respondents reported altruistic
motives as the drive for corporate giving, it can
be questioned if a ‘social desirability bias’
influenced the results of this study. It is
possible that respondents over-reported social
motives for corporate giving in order to be
politically correct (Cowton, 1987; Campbell
et al., 1999). Following Cowton (1987), this
was controlled for in the present study by
asking respondents whether their companies
make public the fact that they give to a certain
cause or organization. In the case of corporate
charitable giving, 86% of the respondents
reported that their companies did not make
public how much was given. In the case of
corporate sponsorship, a large majority (70%)
of the respondents indicated that they did not
make their sponsoring activities public. It
should be mentioned that in the case of
corporate sponsorship, the use of the control
variable can be questioned since the non
profit recipient could take care of notifying
the community by displaying/mentioning the
sponsor’s name. In addition, the size of a firm
might also influence whether the company will
make their sponsoring activities public.1
Suggestions for further research
Although one stream of CSR research focuses
on the relationship between the broader theme
of ‘corporate social performance’ and finan-
cial performance (Griffin and Mahon, 1997;
Preston and O’Bannon, 1997; Roman et al.,
1999; Orlitzky, 2003), more research is needed
that investigates the antecedents and conse-
quences of corporate giving. Studies of the
antecedents of corporate giving may focus for
example on the role of company size on the
development of corporate giving policies
(Brammer and Millington, 2004).
Recent studies concerning the conse-
quences of corporate giving on reputation
—————
1An additional logistic regression analysis showed indeed
that, as was suggested by one of the anonymous
reviewers, the larger the company (as measured by the
number of employees), the more likely it is that the
company will make public that it supports a good cause or
societal organization (b¼ 0.23, odds ratio¼ 1.25).
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examined the direct effect of corporate giving
on reputation (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990;
Dean, 2003). Future research may also focus on
an indirect effect of corporate social perfor-
mance on reputation, namely via change in
corporate identity. This type of research
question links CSR literature with literature
about organizational identity. According to
Barney and Stewart (2000), organizational
identity can be a source of competitive advan-
tage for companies. Peterson (2004) found that
workers’ favorable perceptions of corporate
citizenship were indeed associated with higher
organizational commitment. A more coherent
identity may, in turn, improve the reputation of
a company.
The present study focused on often-men-
tioned motivations for corporate giving. We
provided a classification into five types of
motivations, but it could be questioned
whether these motives need to be classified
into fewer or more categories, or how one can
distinguish between them conceptually and
from a measurement point of view. It can be
argued, for example, that the employee com-
mitment motivation and the support of the
local community are both expressions of
commercial motives as firms will always
demand committed personnel and good stand-
ing. However, if a manager feels morally
obliged to motivate his/her employees or to
support the local community, these motives
may be classified as altruistic motives. In
addition, as is also indicated in the discussion
subsection, it is unreasonable to assume that a
donor has only one motive for giving. A fuller
treatment of possible motives, however, could
enhance research on corporate giving beha-
vior, for instance looking at the relation of
these motives with concepts that are used to
describe private charitable giving such as
‘impact philanthropy’ (Duncan, 2004) and
‘warm-glow giving’ (Andreoni, 1989, 1990,
1998).
Moreover, more comparative research is
needed. Estimations of the amount of corpo-
rate giving in European countries are uncom-
mon. King and Tchepournyhk (2004) formu-
lated a four-factor model that they used to
outline the differences between corporate
giving in the USA and in Russia. Such compara-
tive research would be an important further
step, for instance also including tax regimes.
However, addressing the call for more interna-
tional comparison—which is supported by the
growing attention for globalization, CSR, and
the role of multinational corporations—starts
with gaining an insight into different national
settings.
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APPENDIX
Table A1. Description of the companies in the sample
2003 2001 1999 1997 1995
Characteristic
Industry
Industry 11% 10% 17% 14% 14%
Building 11% 11% 13% 12% 7%
Wholesaler’s business 14% 12% 14% 14% 15%
Car industry 6% 7% 7% 6% 7%
Retail trade food 10% 11% 8% 10% 8%
Retail trade non-food 15% 15% 12% 11% 17%
Catering industry 9% 8% 5% 5% 6%
Transport 8% 10% 7% 10% 9%
Commercial service 16% 15% 18% 18%a 17%a
Banking/insurance 1% 2% 17% — —
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
n 1005 998 1010 1092 1122
Number of employees
1–4 persons 35% 32% 34% 34% 42%
5–9 persons 20% 19% 19% 17% 21%
10–19 persons 16% 15% 19% 13% 16%
20–49 persons 14% 17% 16% 15% 11%
50–99 persons 7% 8% 5% 9% 10%b
100 and more persons 8% 9% 8% 10% —
Negligible, less than 1 FTE — — — 2% —
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
n 1005 998 1010 1092 1122
Note. a In 1997 and 1995 the categories commercial service and banking/insurance were merged together.
b In 1995 the categories 50–99 persons and more than 100 persons were merged together.
Table A2. Description of the total number of Dutch companies, grouped by staff members and business sector
1 2–4 5–9 10–19 20–49 50–99 100þ Total
Industry 16 300 14 700 6000 4500 4200 1700 1800 49 200
Building 39 800 16 200 7400 4500 3300 1200 700 73 100
Wholesaler’s business 23 700 23 100 9800 4800 4500 900 500 67 300
Car industry 4200 6400 3100 1700 900 150 50 16 500
Retail trade food 5400 10 900 4300 1700 1000 350 100 23 750
Retail trade non-food 45 400 46 500 14 800 5800 1500 300 100 114 400
Catering industry 7900 23 400 6500 2200 950 250 100 41 300
Transport 8700 9900 2900 3200 1500 650 350 27 200
Commercial service 106 800 66 900 19 100 9200 6100 1400 1200 210 700
Banking/insurance 1800 2700 2000 900 800 450 400 9050
Communication 600 600 250 400 200 100 200 2350
Total 260 600 221 300 76 150 38 900 24 950 7450 5500 634 850
The data are provided by TNS NIPO and are based on figures of the Chamber of Commerce, 2002.
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